14/01/2026

WEDNESDAY | JAN 14, 2026

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Trump’s tripolar order: Can it Maga? T HE abduction of Venezuela President Nicolás Maduro and his wife in early January, conducted by the United States (US) military, and the

subsequent detailing by President Donald Trump justifying it as part of the “Donroe Doctrine” – a rebranding and radical expansion of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine – can be seen as the first major pillar of a tripolar world order that Trump is defining for the US and the world. Under this tripolar strategy, the Trump administration is not seeking a return to the bipolar Cold War (US vs USSR) era, with China or Russia singled out as the existential threat and enemy today. Neither is he intent on propping up the post 1991 unipolar liberal order of which the US has been the undoubted leader until recently. Instead, he has recognised his inability to “make America great again (Maga)” without reinventing US dominance of the world order and system. Why he is doing so is self-evident. The last 20 years has seen the breakdown of the Western dominated global order marked by the rise of non-Western powers, internal fractures in the Western bloc and the emergence of new forms of global competition. This breakdown is not the result of a single failure but rather a perfect storm of structural, economic and domestic factors, with the main one stemming from developments within the US, the decline of Western neo-colonial power and the rise of China and South countries. It is clear that these three components – the “rise of the rest”, the internal fracturing of the US and the decline of Europe, and inherent contradictions of the liberal order – have galvanised Trump into action towards a world that he sees and wants divided into three distinct, non-overlapping spheres of influence: the Western led by the US, the European led by Russia sharing with the European Union and the Asian led by China, with India and other Asian countries in a supporting role. If realised, this concept of a “tripolar world” – centred on the US, China and Russia – will move from academic theory to become the core of Trump’s “America First” realism. This vision represents a fundamental departure from the era of US global hegemony. Instead of trying to police the entire world through an increasingly disrespected and widely regarded as duplicitous and even hypocritical liberal world order, most recently exposed by its indifference to the genocidal war pursued by Israel in Gaza, Trump is steering towards a system where three major powers dominate their respective spheres of influence, with the US asserting itself as the “first among equals” and maintaining dominance, if not hegemony. Geometry of the tripolar system The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy implicitly recognised three primary coexisting centres of power. Its goal is not to eliminate China or Russia as rivals but to contain and manage them through transactional deals that reduce US global burdens while maximising returns for America. The American sphere This is the fortress from which the US operates, focusing on resource extraction, regional supply chains, border security and other concerns to make America great for the domestic constituency. It is one in which Venezuela, with its oil wealth, became the first target, and Greenland in the cross-hair, now becoming a national security priority due to the island’s strategic military position and natural resources. Under Trump, as well as the next incoming Republican president, Canada is no longer treated as a “special ally” but will be a junior partner whose sovereignty is secondary to US security and economic interests. Discussions regarding the potential annexation of Canada or its territories have

Trump’s focus on controlling Venezuela and minting money from its oil has been touted as designed to make his American sphere self-sufficient and immune to the increasing economic challenge from China. – REUTERSPIC

moved from rhetorical threats to a central focus of the Trump Administration’s foreign policy. Mexico will be a much harder neighbour to take over in any way, although Trump has significantly escalated rhetoric regarding unilateral military strikes within Mexican territory to target drug cartels. Trump’s focus on controlling Venezuela and minting money from its oil has been touted as designed to make his American sphere self-sufficient and immune to the increasing economic challenge from China. However, this unilateral action against diplomatic norms, regional sovereignty and international relations principles is also intended to warn all South American governments to accept US overlordship of the region or risk being replaced by a US imposed one. The European-Russian sphere Trump’s policy of “pragmatic retrenchment” in Europe, including his push for a negotiated end to the Ukraine conflict, effectively acknowledges a Russian sphere of influence in Europe. By reducing US support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) in Ukraine, Trump has signalled that European security is a European problem, not an American one. At the same time, he has successfully manoeuvred Nato

indicated a willingness to “share the world”, provided China respects and gives way to US interests. If the visit is successful, it is likely to see the US cede influence in Asia-Pacific in exchange for bilateral concessions and trade deals. Recent analyses suggest Trump is not concerned with or committed to countering Chinese claims in the First Island Chain (for example, the South China Sea or even Taiwan) if the visit outcome facilitates a major trade deal to reduce US financial frailty. Can Trump’s tripolar world order work? It is early days yet to predict how Trump’s tripolar world order and associated world system in the economic realm will shape and work out. Apart from the inherent instability of tripolarity, Trump’s economy – even with its tariff war returns – does not appear healthy enough to sustain the global ambitions of Maga. There is also growing domestic opposition to the Republican Party and Trump, which, if effective in the midterm elections, may see him reduce his foreign policy ambitions to focus on placating the local constituency of voters suffering from foreign policy fatigue. Whatever lies ahead in the world order dynamics, smaller nations in the three spheres will have to continue defending their political and economic sovereignty and leverage their collective weight on the major powers to ensure fairness and justice in international relations. For countries in the global South – whose development already faces compounded challenges including severe impacts from climate change, overwhelming debt burdens, poverty, food insecurity and inadequate health and education systems – the combination of strong leadership, robust self-reliance and BRICS membership may be necessary to provide an additional layer of security and well-being in any permutation of the tripolar world order. LimTeck Ghee’s Another Take is aimed at demystifying social orthodoxy. Comments: letters@thesundaily.com

expected to exceed US$400 billion (RM1.62 trillion). Ensuring that the American economy does not implode from its current fiscal crisis is a key part of his tripolar strategy. Hence, increased US armament sales to the rest of the world is necessary to create American jobs, boost the defence industry and generate revenue. The Chinese sphere While Trump’s remaking of the American and European spheres have seen much action, that in Asia appears to be a work in progress. For now, with the US locked in a trade war with Beijing, the Trump administration is pivoting from its emphasis on military containment to include economic containment, with new demands that allies like Japan and South Korea help rebuild the US industrial and hi-tech manufacturing sectors. The evolution of the China segment of the tripolar framework of Trump’s administration has posed an unprecedented challenge because China offers an exceptional model of political and socioeconomic development through a communist government that has successfully challenged the appeal of liberal democracy and American capitalism. Hence, the Trump handling of the Chinese sphere has seen a shift to a more nuanced transactional and regionalised strategy. This approach basically moves

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“The Trump administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy implicitly recognised three primary coexisting centres of power. Its goal is not to eliminate China or Russia as rivals but to contain and manage them through transactional deals that reduce US global burdens while maximising returns for America.

the US away from its post-WWII policeman of Asia-Pacific role towards a system of mutually recognised spheres of influence with China and leaves Australia and Japan as deputy sheriffs to maintain the regional status quo in favour of the US. Before his April visit to Beijing, Trump had

towards a more autonomous role by pressing allies to commit to spending 5% of GDP on defence and security by 2035. This unprecedented surge will create a massive pipeline for US armament sales. Over the next five years (2026 to 2030), total sales of US armaments to Nato allies are